Can NATO's "new" allies and key partners exercise national-level command in crisis and war? by Young, Thomas-Durell
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Faculty and Researchers Faculty and Researchers' Publications
2018
Can NATO's "new" allies and key partners
exercise national-level command in crisis and war?
Young, Thomas-Durell
Routledge
Young, Thomas-Durell. (2018) Can NATO's "new" allies and key partners exercise
national-level command in crisis and war?, Comparative Strategy, 37:1, 9-21
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/57363
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.
Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun
COMPARATIVE STRATEGY
, VOL. , NO. , –
https://doi.org/./..
Can NATO’s “new”allies and key partners exercise national-level
command in crisis and war?
Thomas-Durell Young
Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, CA, USA
ABSTRACT
This article posits that most postcommunist members of NATO and key part-
ners continue the practice of using communist concepts of command at the
national level of governance. These concepts include the hyper-centralization
of decision making, collective decision making, and of most concern, unclear
chains of command and alignment of authority with responsibility. Combined,
these concepts have the potential for inhibiting the timely and clear command
of anation’s armed forces, let alone their effective assimilation into thealliance’s
integrated command structure. Such an eventuality has clearly negative impli-
cations for the alliance generally, but these weaknesses also could have the
unexpected consequence of compromising “new” allies’ national sovereignty
in crisis and war.
Since the end of the Cold War, one critical area of democratic governance that has yet to take hold
throughout countries in Central and Eastern Europe relates to the viability of national-level chains
of command. In another forum, the current writer has addressed specifically the issue of why the
slow adoption of democratic defense governance concepts throughout the region has impeded the
development of “commanders” as understood in theWest, which is best appreciated through examining
these defense institutions’ basic organizational sociological principles.1 This essay examines the other
side of the issue by positing the question: how well is national-level command likely to be exercised
by these governments? This capability must be judged as problematic for two reasons. First, following
the wave of democratization after the end of the Cold War, newly elected officials were concerned that
these fragile democracies would be unwise to entrust the command of their armed forces to elected
governments. This resulted in most designating heads of state (president) as “commanders in chief,”
as opposed to the heads of government (prime ministers), let alone ministers of defense. The key
assumption on which this practice was based was that heads of state would act as a counterbalance to
everyday partisan political intrigues.2 Second, clear chains of command and the key instruments which
animate any command structure, command authorities, remain to be developed and validated through
simulations and exercises. Legacy command concepts that are based on hyper-centralization of decision
making remain tacitly, if unwittingly, accepted throughout the region.
Despite reforms by some governments in recent years to address this imbalance between respon-
sibilities and accountability in governance (e.g., Georgia being a recent notable example),3 existing
national-level command arrangements throughout the region should be assessed as problematic on four
levels. First, by assigning this critical national responsibility to presidents, heads of elected governments
are either excluded from national chains of command, or their authorities are ambiguous and/or simply
not defined. This is clearly antithetical to democratic defense governance concepts, as it is elected
governments via their ministers of defense that are responsible, and indeed held accountable to citizens,
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for spending public funds to create defense outcomes. Yet in most of these countries they are not clearly
part of the chain of command, as established in constitution or law. Moreover, as democracies, it is
their parliaments which are charged with responsibility for providing institutional oversight of armed
forces. Yet, where presidents are designated commanders in chief, they nevertheless have very little
institutional and constructive means (outside of a team of advisers) to carry out this mandate. In this
regard, their appointment as commander in chief also undermines the democratic idea of civilian
control of the military as presidents in extreme cases take upon themselves the military mantle, i.e.,
wearing a uniform. In Ukraine, President Petro Poroshenko has even takenmilitary decisions during the
current crisis. Thus, there is no longer a duality of thinking or questioning of military logic at any part
of the decision-making process as presidents try to act and think militarily. Political responsibility and
accountability are compromised further when presidents approve the appointment of senior field-grade
and general officers, including the chief of defense (CHOD), often with no more than political or social
understanding of their capabilities and therefore are often chosen for the wrong reasons. This problem
is especially acute in small structures and countries where such actions can result in the creation of
a moral debt and the personalization of loyalty through the provision of employment. This has the
perverse effect of not the militarization of the civilian side, but rather the politicization of the military.
Second, designating presidents as commanders in chief whilst not defining clearly which authorities
that office possess (and by extension, what is the role of the head of government and the minister of
defense) opens these governments to potential conflicts in periods where the president and the govern-
ment are from opposing parties, i.e., cohabitation.Without attention paid to the details of precisely which
elected official commands what, and under which circumstances, suggests that these arrangements are
unlikely to function effectively in periods of escalation (i.e., peace, tension, crisis), as well as in war. Fur-
thermore, one can find examples of how command is to be exercised via ad hoc (but generally untested)
chains of command, e.g., Bulgaria (vide infra). Such a command arrangement fundamentally breaks the
time-testedWestern principle of the essentiality of the unity and continuity of command.As applied at the
national level, this holds that there is only one standing and constantly trained and tested national chain
of command that does not change during periods of peace, tension, crisis, and war: only the authorities
of designated officials are modified by senior political leadership in accordance with law and policy.
Third, in the particular context of Central and Eastern Europe, “command” as an instrument of gov-
ernance based on Western concepts is only vaguely defined, but at its heart is that it implies absolute
control. This lack of differentiation of authorities is particularly troubling, as even in countries that des-
ignate the heads of government as “commanders” of the armed forces, these otherwise clear national
chains of command do not have legally defined, used, and exercised “command authorities.” Such instru-
ments are essential to ensuring that commanders possess sufficient authorities to command effectively
their forces.
Fourth and finally, what is disturbing is that these problematic national chains of command and
underdeveloped command arrangements have yet to evince concern amongst most of these young
democracies in the region. There is an obvious lack of self-awareness and understanding that the exer-
cise of national command remains based on legacy concepts that, when used in a context of democratic
governance, will result in confusion in crisis, and therefore, national interests will suffer. Moreover, in
new NATO allies where the operational level of command is either nonexistent or exists in name only,
it is difficult to envisage a positive outcome should NATO forces of operational size arrive in an Arti-
cle 5 conflict since it is unclear where such forces would “plug in” into national command structures.
In either circumstance, it is likely a member’s sovereign continuity could be challenged or thoroughly
undermined, notwithstanding the best intensions of allies.
The purpose of this essay is to examine the challenges associated with the continued use of legacy
concepts of command that is likely to lead to confusion over national decision making in those govern-
ments that possess underdeveloped chains of command. Clarity of institutional responsibilities is further
compromised in these countries where legacy concepts continue to be used, especially those that over-
centralize decision making. What should be of concern to all NATO allies is that those governments
which possess these command arrangements could result in failures in command that have implications
for all members. Thus, poor performance or failure of national-level command in any country in the
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alliance could have serious negative consequences for the ability of the collective to respond effectively
in case of an Article 5 (collective defense) scenario. Moreover, this condition holds within the context
of a Partnership for Peace member, where such failures would obviate against the ability of nations to
respond effectively to entreatments for assistance in crisis.What is even perhapsmost troubling is the lack
of immediacy shared by governments with these conflicting and/or underdeveloped command arrange-
ments, given that its record of success in the region is nonexistent, e.g., Georgia in 2008, and Ukraine
from 2014 until today.
In this analysis, the current writer takes care to differentiate between those governments that continue
the practice of legacy thinking as expressed in highly centralized decisionmaking by the head of state, as
opposed to those that have broken free of this atavistic concept. In exposing to a wide audience the con-
tinued reliance bymost newNATOmembers onwhat are, in truth of fact, communist-legacy concepts of
command, the essay demonstrates the widespread nature of this problem. Furthermore, in making this
case, the essay posits that absent consistent political pressure from “old” NATO members, these prob-
lematic command structures and practices will continue to pose a danger both to these nations, as well
as to the alliance as a whole.
Communist national-level command/centralization
National command is defined in the West as constituting discrete, constitutionally derived and legally
defined authorities (e.g., [re]assigning missions and/or tasks, establishing training objectives and stan-
dards, etc.) which are mutually exclusive, and created with the view to their hierarchical and integrated
execution.4 Such differentiation under communism was nonexistent. As defined and practiced in com-
munist countries, command was equated to the exercise of absolute power. In the Soviet Union and its
Warsaw Pact satellites, the national command system of armed forces was highly centralized and com-
mand resided in general staffs where all decisions, of any consequence, weremade.Nothing toomundane
and routine could escape decision making at the national level, to include even operational planning.5
In this system, there was symbiosis of “civilian” and the “military” in the form of a politicized officer
corps which resulted in general staffs given wide berth in the areas of “military doctrine” (i.e., defense
policy), strategy, and force development.6 What is incongruent to the Western observer, however, is the
lack of an in-being functional command and control structure. Rather, Soviet military doctrine held that
the peacetime structure was more an administrative one, whereas in wartime, already designated and
practiced battle-staffs would be established to exercise command and oversee coordination.7
The armed forces of Warsaw Pact countries fell under the direct command of the Soviet General
Staff, as exercised through various theater and army-level headquarters, organized throughout Central
and Eastern Europe. The exception to this state of affairs being Romania after the introduction of its
Total Defense doctrine which, after studying the lessons of theWarsaw Pact’s invasion of Czechoslovakia,
created the Defense Council of Socialist Republic of Romania that included all key military and political
leadership under the commander in chief. This body was seen as being capable of reacting quickly in
the event of imminent attack. Moreover, this command arrangement did not allow national command
to be transferred to an outside (i.e., Warsaw Pact) authority.8 Parenthetically, according to new post–
Cold War research, the Soviets instituted in 1980 what was called the Statute system, which envisaged
that prior to the outbreak of conflict, Soviet commanders would seize control of the armed forces of its
satellites due to their perceived political untrustworthiness.9 Not surprisingly, at independence, none of
these armed forces had any concept of what constituted national command of their armed forces in the
context of democratic governance. As such, key legacy command concepts still can be found in most of
these countries.
Conversely, communist Yugoslavia was an exception to this practice. Its defense institution practiced
a hybrid form of Yugoslav centralization and decentralization, which melded both communist and
Western traditions and concepts. As in the case of Romania, following the Warsaw pact’s invasion of
Czechoslovakia in 1968, a territorial defense concept was adopted. In each republic, territorial defense
commands and subordinated forces were established. Although the League of Communists, via the
state presidency, authorized the minister of defense to command the Yugoslav Peoples’ Army (JNA)
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and, ultimately, territorial defense forces,10 the 1969 General Peoples’ Defense Act defined the JNA
and republic-based Territorial Defense Forces as coequals, thereby ending the practice of placing the
latter under the command of the former. Yet, on the insistence of JNA leadership, the 1974 Defense
Act was passed which clarified the command relationships of territorial defense forces, which had
the effect of reinforcing unity by their subordination to the JNA’s chain of command. This act limited
the delegation of command to republic officials,11 but only in the extreme case of foreign aggression.12
Uniquely for a communist armed force, elements of “command” were defined, for example, in 1983
following the adoption of the policy of Jedinstvo (unity) to include planning, preparation, realization,
execution, and control. “Principles” of command were also defined, yet to a Westerner they appear
to be more akin to principles of war (unity, consistency, flexibility, efficiency, and security).13 Finally,
as the officer corps were universally members of the League of Communists, the JNA had a unique
command dynamic where the traditional military chain-of-command relationship was balanced by a
shared political affiliation, and vice versa, by the shared commonality of party militarization.
Postcommunist national-level command practices
It is not unusual to see that some twenty-five-plus years after the fall of communism, many defense acts
that outline command arrangements are still based on communist concepts, with a preference for the
establishment of command structures only in crisis and based onmobilization. These laws exhibit a weak
conceptual understanding of the Western approach to command that stresses unity of command, one
command structure in peace, tension, crisis, and war, and clearly defined command authorities assigned
to commanders, as delegated by elected governments to fulfill policy objectives. Examples of command
authorities can be found in U.S. andNATO doctrine (e.g., COCOM,OPCOM,OPCON, TACON, etc.)14
Not only are these legacy arrangements problematic in wartime (a cursory review of Ukraine’s inability
to exercise command effectively against Russian separatists since 2014 should make this case rather con-
clusively),15 but they have led to unending domestic political conflicts within those governments where
presidents are designated as commanders in chief. Typically, one can characterize these national-level
command arrangements as underdeveloped, as they invest undefined “command” in the president, whilst
in some countries laws enable him/her to bypass the prime minister and (even) the minister of defense
and issue orders directly to the CHOD.
In post-Soviet republics it is a prevailing norm that the president is commander in chief of the armed
forces, and there is a differentiated command structure in peace and war. As to the former point (the
Baltic States excepted), the president either appoints; or must approve, senior officer promotions and
appointments, to include in some cases the CHOD. For instance, in Ukraine the Verkhovna Rada (par-
liament) approves keyministers (i.e., primeminister, minister of defense, and foreignminister) upon the
recommendation by the president.16 Yet, the minister of defense has very little visibility over the manage-
ment of the ministry of defense. Indeed, the Verkhovna Rada’s laws have little real influence over how
defense money is actually spent by the ministry of defense. Moreover, the president, with or without
the agreement of the minister of defense, appoints senior officers, to include the CHOD.17 As a result,
the prime minister and the minister of defense lack the authority to command the armed forces. Gov-
ernment policy is inhibited from being exercised, since the president can manipulate how the budget is
distributed and spent. Further strengthening the hand of the president is that the cabinet of ministers
and presidential administration are not accountable to parliament, but rather only to the president. As
seen in fighting with separatists in Eastern Ukraine, the president gives orders directly to the CHOD,
thereby bypassing the prime minister and minister of defense. Effective oversight of the defense institu-
tion by the Verkhovna Rada is further impeded by the lack of experts supporting members who sit on
its Standing Commission on Security and Defense.18
Given both the powerful status of presidencies in these countries, and correspondinglyweakministers
of defense (not to mention prime ministers, Azerbaijan being an example where ministers are account-
able only to the president);19 it should not be surprising that exercising effective command of the armed
forces, as defined byWestern concepts, is incomprehensible. In Moldova, the prime minister is not even
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a member of the Supreme Commandment, which includes the president, minister of defense, CHOD,
and the commanders of the border guards and carabineer troops.20 Until recently, one could include
Armenia with these other two countries suffering from an unbalanced political structure that would
likely impede the execution of national command. Previously, with the exception of declaring war, the
national assembly had no constitutional role in defense, nor did the prime minister, whilst the minis-
ter of defense played a dominant role in defense decision making.21 Amendments to the constitution in
2015 have set in motion a transition to change from a presidential to a parliamentary system whereby
the president’s powers will be greatly curtailed.22 Equally encouraging, a defense policy document was
released in 2011 (a rare event) that argued the need for a unitary national command structure that would
be viable in both peace and wartime, as well as in other nondefense national emergencies.23
Georgia also provides a unique case of a country that has made efforts to adopt some Western com-
mand concepts, but has yet to establish clear authorities. Since its war with Russia in 2008,24 Georgian
officials have examined how to improve the government’s ability to respond to crises and conduct war.
In recent years, at the national level, political focus has been directed to review the provisions of the
1995 constitution, which established a strong presidential system with that office having responsibilities
in foreign affairs and defense. This included the president designated as the commander in chief and
supported in this role by a national security council. Since 2012, a number of changes in legislation have
shifted power from the president to the government, to include formulating defense policy without pres-
idential approval.25 Recent legislative initiatives make it clear that there is a growing political consensus
in the country to change the constitution to one that is more parliamentary, as opposed to presidential.26
For instance, in 2015, the government established a state-security and crisis-management council which
has responsibilities in crisismanagement andwhichwill operate at the expense of the president’s national
security council. Significantly, this council’s members are almost exclusively governmental ministers.27
Although these initiatives bode well for improving Georgia’s ability to respond more effectively to crisis,
it is still unknown whether critical reforms to creating national-specific command authorities are envis-
aged, thereby making it clear which senior political officials possess authorities to direct commanders in
crisis and war.
In former Soviet space, and aside from Georgia and Armenia, the major exceptions to the aforemen-
tioned observations are the Baltic States which, over time, have created greater coherence in the exercise
of national command. For instance, after independence in 1991, the drafters of the Estonian constitution
opted to reinstate the pre-1940 practice of designating the president as commander in chief who appoints
the wartime commander. Left out of this legal calculus was the fact that the elected government had no
explicitly stated role in the command of the Estonian Defense Force. To their credit, Estonian politicians
and officials came to realize that this was unworkable in crisis and in 2008 revised existing legislation
(Defense Forces OrganizationAct),28 whereby there is now no ambiguity that the armed forces fall under
the authority of the minister of defense, ending a period of unbalanced civil-military relations.29 That
said, Estonia adheres to a troubling practice of possessing two distinct national command systems, one
for crisis management under the ministry of internal affairs and a wartime system under the ministry of
defense, thereby hindering unity of command during escalation.30
Similarly, in Latvia, the 1922 constitution was reinstituted following independence, which establishes
the president as commander in chief, who appoints a wartime commander when circumstances so dic-
tate; yet perplexingly, said commander in chief ’s authorities remain undefined.31 The 1993 Law on
Defense Forces wisely placed the commander of the armed forces under the authority of the supreme
council and the minister of defense. Presciently, Latvian officials recognized early on the need for there
to be only one command structure in peace, tension, crisis, and war. In order to ensure that there is con-
tinuity of parliamentary control of the armed forces, a politically appointed parliamentary secretary was
created in 2000. This law also defines the authorities of the commander of the national armed forces and
subordinates him to the minister of defense. Subsequent struggles have continued in the political realm
to diminish the power of the president in favor of the prime minister in the area of defense.32
Lithuanian practicemimics other legacy concepts but with a twist: whereas the president is designated
as commander in chief, and appoints the commander of the armed forces, this decisionmust be approved
by the parliament. The administration of the armed forces is left to the government, but its precise role in
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directing the commander is not stated. Yet, the 1996 Law on the Basics of National Security subordinates
the commander of the armed forces to the minister of national defense in peacetime. The commander
is also a full member of the state defense council, which perforce includes him in foreign and domestic
policy matters. At least there is no ambiguity in law that the government would conceivably appoint
another individual to this post in wartime.33 Yet, although the commander is under the president and
the minister of national defense, the role of the primeminister is left undefined. As the president and the
minister of national defense are designatedwith the uniqueAmerican nomenclature “national command
authority,”34 one can detect the ill-informed hand of U.S.-inspired advice, which has been improperly
applied because the prime minister (as head of government) has been left out of this national chain of
command.35
Post–Warsaw Pact republics have universally struggled to develop effective national command
arrangements and authorities that are in keepingwith those found in long-standingNATOnations.What
is remarkable is not that the other communist legacy typologies largely share the same systematic weak-
ness in this critically important aspect of civil control of the armed forces, but rather that years of NATO
membership has yet to exert meaningful influence across these countries, pressing them to reform what
are clearly problematic at best command arrangements. As for background, notwithstanding the priv-
ileged position in society of the armed forces under the communist party, there was no question that
they were firmly under the control of the party’s leadership. A positive result of this legacy tradition is
the fact that the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact (the Polish military’s response to the Solidarity move-
ment in 1981 being a notable exception) were conditioned not to interfere in national affairs, a norm
not practiced by their respective ministries of internal affairs.36 This is an important distinction tomake,
given that drafting new democratic constitutions explicitly ensured that the control of the armed forces
was placed under the authority of the head of state and in some cases even included provisions that the
president confirms promotions and appointments of general officers (to include the CHOD); or, even
more disconcerting, the appointment of a wartime commander in the case of war (who may not even be
the serving CHOD).
In the case of Hungary, this norm went to the extreme case of embracing the unusual solution of
placing the ministry of defense under the primeminister; whilst the general staff and armed forces came
under the authority of the president to ensure that the control of the armed forces did not fall under
the elected government (thereby creating an illusion that they would not be politicized).37 However,
Hungary presents a partially functional case in which, at least in terms of its national command, there
is a high degree of clarity as to hierarchy of authority. The 1989 Hungarian constitution assigned the
control of the armed forces to be shared by both the minister of defense, as well as the president. This
arrangement proved unworkable during the “taxi boycott” inOctober 1990, when theminister of defense
ordered the armed forces to break up the strike, but was countermanded by the president acting in his
role as commander in chief. In 1991, the constitutional court decided a case brought by the minister of
defense which ruled against the president, declaring that he only had the authority to direct the armed
forces, whereas the government had the authority to provide leadership, except in times of crisis.38 But,
whilst this clarified the authority of the government in peacetime, the constitution lays out criteria for the
creation of special legal orders that cite different levels of crisis (state of national crisis, state of emergency,
state of preventative defense, state of unexpected attack, and state of danger). The national assembly is
vested with the power to declare war, but in the event it is unable to meet, a troika of the speaker of
the national assembly, the president of the constitutional court, and the prime minister can determine
that the assembly is not able to fulfill this responsibility; in the case of “emergency” (and the national
assembly cannot meet/act), the president can decide on employing the armed forces. In crisis situations,
it is envisaged that a national defense council will be established and chaired by the president. It is to
be comprised of the speaker of the national assembly, the leaders of parliamentary groups, the prime
minister, ministers, and the CHOD acting in a consultative capacity.39 In effect, this council takes over
the role of the government and in effect uses a legacy concept of creating a forum for collective decision
making (collegium), but without the “benefit” of single-political-party cohesion, as was the case in the
communist era.40 Whilst it might have the benefit of encouraging consensus making and coordination,
precisely how a body with such politically heterogeneous membership could be expected to act quickly
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in crisis must be assessed as problematic. Also missing in the constitution and law are defined command
authorities and how they are to be delegated and to whom.
Poland likely reached the apotheosis of confusion in national command in its 1991 defense law by
making the president commander in chief, whilst stating that the minister of national defense “com-
mands the armed forces of the Republic of Poland. Whether or not senior officers, for example, were
subordinate to the President or the defence minister in a chain-of-command was unclear and open to
interpretation.” This patently unworkable arrangement required a change in the constitution to clarify
these critically important distinctions.41 Poland presents an example, in fact, of how such clarification
in the command of the armed forces is unlikely to constitute a simple, or a single, act of legislation
and/or constitutional redrafting. In the 1997 constitution, a compromise was agreed whereby the presi-
dent remained supreme commander in chief of the armed forces, but in peacetime he would discharge
his duties through the minister of national defense. In the case of war, it was envisaged that the highest
commander of the armed forces would be nominated by the prime minister. Yet, at the same time, par-
liamentarians left powerful authorities with the president, e.g., the authority to nominate the CHOD and
general officers. The peacetime oversight of the armed forces fell under the authority of the council of
ministers, but the critical issue of what precisely was the role of the president in wartime remained unde-
fined.42 As late as 2013, a key policy document lamented the weak state of command at the national level
and cited that the minister of national defense possessed ambiguous authorities to control the armed
forces, particularly related to accountability, implementation, and decision making. The National Secu-
rity Bureau recognized that existing national-level command arrangements were insufficient and greater
clarification was needed, to include providing the minister of national defense with more specific and
expanded command authorities.43 In consequence, the government transformed its Operational Com-
mand into a Joint Operations Command (JOC) and invested its commander with command authorities
previously exercised by service commands and the general staff.44 However, the result of this reorga-
nization has proven to be suboptimal, as it created conflict between the commander of the JOC and
the CHOD (“first soldier”) by not establishing precisely who commands the armed forces in wartime.45
These contradictory policies have recently been addressed whereby the authorities of the CHOD have
been reinforced, the JOC is to be closed, and the latter’s authorities are to be transferred to service head-
quarters. Encouragingly, a process of determining command authorities appropriate at the national level
will be addressed through a series of exercises and staff training.46
Another example of the inability of a newNATOmember to reject and replace legacy command con-
cepts is provided by Bulgaria. The 2009 revision to the BulgarianDefense Act (which remains unchanged
in this area) continues the practice of reinforcing the role of the president as commander in chief, approv-
ing the appointment of general officers,47 as well as reinforcing the odd practice of, in emergency or
wartime, possessing the authority to establish a “strategic command” through merging the ministry
of defense and general staff.48 Precisely how such an arrangement could ever possibly function is not
known, given that it has never been subjected to any rigorous assessments, simulations, or exercises to
validate either the structure or its operating procedures. Actually declaring martial law, or an emergency
situation, could prove to be problematic. Although this authority resides with parliament, acting on a
proposal of the president, or the council of ministers, the possibility that the president and council of
ministers might disagree over whether the actual situation would require the declaration of martial law,
or an emergency situation, is not addressed in law.49 The drafters of the 2009Defense Act and subsequent
governments have yet to address a singular legal deficiency that creates (or perhaps simply perpetuates)
a Byzantine legal labyrinth that holds that the office of the CHOD suffers from the dual subordination to
the defenseminister, as well as to the president, when the latter is exercising his/her authority as supreme
commander.50 Topaloff sums up the weakness in the legislation well:
The [2009] Act, however, did little to resolve the existing conflict between the President and the Government with
regard to who has the authority to declare martial law and a state of emergency, or how differences would be settled
in case of conflict between them.51
Finally, as is all too often the case in other countries in the region, key issues of command authorities
remain to be defined.52
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Romania has long shared a number of problematic practices and assumptions that would likely
impede the exercise of national-level command in crisis and war. Like other countries in the region,
the president is designated as commander in chief, but lacks the power to dismiss the prime minister
and at least in terms of defense, parliament is responsible for defense policy (i.e., it approves the national
defense strategy). Yet the president chairs the supreme council of national defense, which offers that office
considerable influence in defense, e.g., declaration of the state of emergency and mobilization. And like
the Bulgarian case, in war, until recently it envisaged the establishment of a “grand headquarters” to com-
mand the armed forces.53 This was clearly an unsatisfactory arrangement and efforts weremade to create
adequate standing commands at the operational level. There existed the 2nd joint operational-level com-
mand in Buzău, but it suffered from insufficient personnel and authorities. In 2014, its responsibilities
were moved to Bucharest to a new JOC (Comandamentul Fortelor Intrunite [CFI]), which reached full
operational capability in 2017. In peacetime, the CFI plans, coordinates, and controls operations of the
armed forces in the country and in external theaters of operations. In crisis, declaration of siege status,
declaration of mobilization, or state of war, the CFI will plan and command operations.54 What this
development indicates is that the armed forces are likely still in the embryonic stages of understanding
the operational level of war in its full joint nature. Second, the CFI’s collocation in the general staff sug-
gests that the latter could assume responsibility for “commanding” the armed forces in crisis and war,
thereby blurring its strategic and operational responsibilities (e.g., conducting normal peacetime busi-
ness, advising the president and government on national-level security and defense issues). The proposal,
therefore, to move the CFI to a location outside of Bucharest (distancing itself from the Centrul Naţional
Militar de Comandă [NUCLEU])) is sound and should be executed as soon as possible.
In Slovakia, the president is designated as the commander in chief of the armed forces, but enjoys
no peacetime functions or authorities, although that office does approve the appointment of the CHOD
on the recommendation by the minister of defense. However, in wartime, the president chairs the state
defense council and the CHOD reports directly to him. Bodies such as the state defense council are
common in the region and function as a focal point for decision making related to issues of national
defense.55 What is troubling is that whilst these bodies are likely effective in coordinating peacetime
business, their functionality in crisis and war is less convincing, especially as they do not control the
defense budget. As one can see that in other countries in the region, there remains a strong political
and social proclivity to use such bodies to “collectivize” decision making, i.e., in the form of creating
formal, or even informal, collegia. Moreover, it is even more problematic that such a body could possibly
be effective in coordinating policy in crisis, let alone war, if the heads of state and government were from
different political parties (i.e., cohabitation).
In sum, twenty-five years after independence, national-level command in formerWarsaw Pact coun-
tries are only slowly retiring legacy command concepts, assumptions, and logic. What is disturbing is
that there appears to be little concern that these critical governance concepts are not fit for purpose. For
instance, Zipfel, writing in 2001, asserts that the Czech command system of the president as commander
in chief is functional because all the president’s decisions must be countersigned by the prime minister
and minister of defense.56 But, this is unlikely to be validated until there is an actual national-level crisis
and this countersigning system is put to the stress of political decisionmaking, andwhen time is normally
not in great abundance. Moreover, how can legacy command concepts be countenanced as supportive of
democratic norms and principles when, as in the case of Bulgaria, two former chiefs of defense (General
Miho Mihov and General Nikola Kolev), who clashed publicly with ministers of defense during their
respective terms in office, were later appointed as defense advisers to the president’s cabinet and, in the
case of the latter, as chief of cabinet?57
Former Yugoslav republics, like other young postcommunist democracies, mostly adopted the prin-
ciple of assigning command of the armed forces not to the head of government, but rather to the head
of state. Conversely, Slovenia very early on wisely defined the president as commander in chief, but did
not invest that office with any legal responsibilities over the armed forces.58 Presciently, as the prime
minister has no explicit powers of national defense, by default the minister of defense is the key decision
maker, at least in peacetime, thereby critically aligning responsibility with authority.59 That said, there
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is evidence of overcentralization of control within the ministry of defense and there is no indication of
clearly defined command authorities.60
Croatia provides a representative and highly documented example of other post–Yugoslav republics
struggling with adopting democratic command concepts. Following the end of the Tudjman era and
the election of Social Democratic Party, an effort was made to reduce the powers of the president in
defense matters, and particularly as related to that office’s influence over personnel decision making.61
Croatia had the unique practice in which the General Staff reported to the president, thereby removing
the minister, the ministry of defense, and indeed the parliament from providing direct oversight of the
armed forces.62 Croatia’s 1991 Law on Defense made an effort to clarify this imbalance by stipulating
that the president exercises command authority through the minister of defense.63 Precisely how well
this process works is questionable, particularly if there is cohabitation, let alone in a period of crisis with
potentially rapid escalation. Indeed, Vesel rightfully argues that, notwithstanding even the constitutional
reforms of 2000 which addressed this situation, the president retained too many authorities over opera-
tional issues that should be within the purview of theminister of defense.64 It is only speculation, but one
might conclude that some of the contentious operational authorities retained by the president could well
include that the president, as supreme commander, has opaque command authorities over the CHOD in
wartime.65 Any such arrangement violates the long-standing Western principle that there must be con-
sistency and continuity in the chain of command throughout all the stages of escalation. Thus, Edmunds’s
assessment is far from optimistic: “While this division of responsibilities is not inherently unworkable
or undemocratic, it is unwieldy and unclear as to where exact institutional responsibilities lie.”66 As he
argues in another of his works, it simply makes no practical sense to designate the president as com-
mander in chief, but then deny him or her any authority over how the armed forces are financed or
developed.67
Many aspects of Croatia’s imperfect command arrangement are replicated amongst other former
Yugoslav republics, e.g., in the respective constitutions and laws on defense in Macedonia, Serbia, and
Montenegro. In the case of Macedonia, in the original wording of the Law of Defense, the minister of
defense was acknowledged as part of the national command structure; however, a 2002 ruling by the
constitutional court clarified matters in the spirit of ensuring unity of command, thereby limiting the
chain of command from the president (supreme commander) to the CHOD. A further complication is
that the CHOD is accountable both to the president and theminister of defense,68 as well as charged with
approving documents used by the army.69 It could be expected that this arrange could lead to complica-
tions when the president and the government are led by two different parties: cohabitation.70 In Serbia,
in response to the overall centralization of authority under the Milosevic regime, the president is the
constitutional head of the armed forces, but does not possess any authority over operational issues. The
authority to issue orders rests with the CHOD, but only after being authorized by the president. What
relationship the CHOD has with the minister of defense in such circumstances is not stated.71 More-
over, within the context of command authorities at the political level, the precise definition of authorities
amongst the president, prime minister, and minister of defense apparently remain sufficiently unclear
as to enable a degree of subjective control of the armed forces which, it has been argued, undermines
professional autonomy.72
Due to its tragic history and torturous creation as a reconstituted republic, Bosnia and Herzegovina
possesses a national command structure that was designed largely by the international community to
ensure decision making by consensus of the two entities. Article 12 of the defense law outlines the oper-
ational and administrative chains of command assigning command and control of the armed forces to
the presidency.73 More specifically, “by the Constitution of BiH, all members of the BiH presidency, by
virtue of their official duty, perform the function of the civilian commander.” Yet,
The Defence Law of BiH sets out that the Standing Committee on Military Matters is an advisory body of the
Presidency of BiH, and is not within the chain of command. This committee considers and gives advice to the
Presidency of BiH on the Security and Defence Policies of BiH.74
But, like other legacy defense institutions, the constitution and laws that address command are
imprecise and can only lead to confusion in time of crisis. For instance, the Defence White Paper of
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Bosnia and Herzegovina identifies that operational command and control can be two distinct command
authorities, as opposed to one, but as these terms are not defined at all, it is not known precisely which
authorities are contained in either term.75
Conclusion
It would be a brave observer who claims that most countries in Central and Eastern Europe have been
able to rid themselves of legacy command concepts. Instead, they have been “grafted” to the new demo-
cratic paradigm, resulting in unclear chains of command, while allowing continued overcentralized of
decision making. The poor performance of the Georgian and Ukrainian defense institutions in com-
manding forces effectively in their respective wars with Russia provide representative examples of how
poorly these legacy command concepts function in democracies. A combination of ad hoc command
structures and as unclear, dual chains of command, complicated by the lack of clearly defined command
authorities based on constitution and law; suggests, if not guarantees, that in crisis, let alone war, offi-
cials will struggle to exercise effective command over their defense and paramilitary forces. It must be
assessed as problematic whether any of these governments could exercise effective command and con-
trol of their armed forces in a full-blown invasion, let alone against a sophisticated enemy that exploits
legal, procedural, and organizational “seams” that are riddled throughout these governance structures.
Added to this pessimistic analysis is the fact that, given the continued practice of requiring high-level
approval for even mundane tasks and activities, these structures and procedures will be highly bur-
dened by massive increases in communications from essentially all elements of defense and paramil-
itary forces requesting approval and guidance. Whilst not wishing to be deterministic, absent reform,
one can expect to see a replication elsewhere in the region of the paralyzed state of the Ukrainian gov-
ernment when it failed to react quickly, let alone effectively, to Russia’s invasion of Crimea in February
2014.
In practical terms, the continued inability of these governments to come to terms with defining clear
chains of command and assigning command authorities to senior elected officials should be a reason for
concern within these governments, as well as for their NATO allies. The current state of nonexisting
or ambiguous authorities, unclearly assigned amongst senior political officials, all but guarantees insti-
tutional disorder and discord in national defense, as the responsibilities and functions of the heads of
government, and very often ministers of defense, are still not explicitly established either in the consti-
tution or enabling laws in most of these countries. This situation has potentially negative consequences
for not only members of the alliance who have inherited these legacy practices, but for the alliance itself
as well. As to the former, not only do these legacy command concepts compromise the ability of govern-
ments to respond quickly and effectively in periods of escalation and war, but by avoiding fully adopting
Western command concepts (and retiring their legacy counterparts), they leave their countries at risk of
not being able to respond in a timely fashion to threats to their interests, and indeed their own national
security. Moreover, within the context of their membership in NATO, the continued use of legacy com-
mand concepts leaves them exposed to allowing their sovereignty to be compromised in the case of
collective defense. An inability on their part to “plug” effectively and quickly into the integrated com-
mand structure could well result in front-line members’ governments being overwhelmed with possibly
uncoordinated allied support, as well as challenging continuity in their national sovereignty.
In the end, the key challenge to reforming these command structures and introducing command
authorities is political. Albeit written in the context of semi-presidentialism as found in the Caucasus
region, Elgie andMoestrup’s advice that the governance of these countries would be improved by adopt-
ing constitutions with a relatively weak presidency76 surely is applicable to all countries in the region still
struggling to adopt fully Western command concepts. It is precisely because this challenge is inherently
political that these problematic national-level command arrangements remain mostly unreformed. Yet,
the political nature of this important weakness in the effective governance of these postcommunist coun-
tries should not dissuade old NATO nations from exerting open, constructive, and persistent pressure
on officials to take the reform of their national command structures both seriously and with a sense of
urgency. The inability to respond quickly and effectively within a proper legal context appropriate to the
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nature of a crisis (i.e., either as a law enforcement response, or response to an act of war) arguably invites
unwanted attention and mischief.
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discussing them at length with me.
14. For definitions and critique of command authorities, see my essay, “The Revolution inMilitary Affairs and Coalition
Operations: Problem Areas and Solutions,” Security and Defense Analysis 19, no. 2 (June 2003): 111–130.
15. Deborah Sanders, “‘ TheWarWeWant, theWar thatWeGet’: Ukraine’sMilitary Reform and the Conflict in the East,”
Journal of Slavic Military Studies 30, no. 1 (2017): 38–40.
16. Constitution of Ukraine, adopted at the Fifth Session of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on June 28, 1996, last
amended, No. 1401-VIII, dated June 2, 2016, Article 85/12.
17. David J. Betz, Civil-Military Relations in Russia and Eastern Europe (New York: Routledge Curzon, 2004), 99.
18. James Sherr, “Ukraine: Reform in the Context of Flawed Democracy and Geopolitical Anxiety,” in Civil-Military
Relations in Post-Communist Europe, 159–160.
19. Tamara Pataraia and Tata Makhatadze, “Defence Institution Building in Azerbaijan,” in Defense Institution Building:
Country Profiles andNeeds Assessments for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, andMoldova; BackgroundMaterials, edited
20 T.-D. YOUNG
by PhilippH. Fluri andViorel Cibotaru (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2008),
33.
20. Viorel Cibotaru, “Defence Reform in Moldova,” in Defense Institution Building: Country Profiles and Needs Assess-
ments for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldova, 86.
21. Aghasi Yenokyan, “Country Study: Armenia,” inDefense Institution Building: Country Profiles and Needs Assessments
for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldova, 10, 17.
22. Malkhaz Nakashidze, “Government Formation and Cabinet Types in New Democracies: Armenia and Georgia in
Comparative European Perspective,” International Comparative Jurisprudence 2 (2016): 27.
23. Armenia, Strategic Defense Review, 2011–2015, Public Release (Yerevan: Ministry of Defense, 2011), 12.
24. See Ronald D. Asmus, A Little War that Shook the World: Georgia, Russia, and the Future of the West (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).
25. Atlantic Council of Georgia, Georgia’s Security Sector Review Project, 17–23.
26. Zedelashvili, “2017 Constitutional Reform in Georgia.”
27. Law of Georgia, “On National Security Policy Planning and Coordination,” T’bilisi, March 4, 2015, Articles 20–26,
https://matsne.gov.ge/en/document/view/2764463.
28. Sintija Oškalne, “Supreme Command and Control of the Armed Forces: The Roles of Presidents, Parliaments, Gov-
ernments, Ministries of Defence and Chiefs of Defence,” in Apprenticeship, Partnership, Membership: Twenty Years of
Defence Development in the Baltic States, edited by Tony Lawrence and Tomas Jermalavičius (Tallinn: International
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